河南师范大学学报(哲学社会科学版)

财务报告问询函监管制度是证券交易所强化一线监管效能的重要创新措施。本文以2015年至2018年中国沪深A股非金融类上市公司为样本,考察财务报告问询函对上市公司年报文本语调的影响。实证研究表明,证券交易所问询函监管制度显著抑制了管理层使用乐观语调的倾向,并且减少了乐观语调操纵行为。尤其是问询函中明确要求中介机构发表意见时,更能有效遏制管理层的乐观语调操纵行为。进一步研究发现,问询函监管与公司内外部治理环境存在互补效应。当公司机构投资者持股比例较低时,问询函监管对年报乐观语调和管理层乐观语调操纵行为的抑制作用更为显著;当公司内部控制水平较差时,问询函监管显著减少了管理层使用乐观语调的倾向,但是对管理层乐观语调操纵行为没有影响。

The supervision system of financial inquiry letters is an important innovative measure to strengthen the first-line supervision efficiency of stock exchanges. Based on the samples of A-share non-financial listed companies on Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges from 2015 to 2018, the paper examines the influence of financial inquiry letters on tone of the text of listed companies' annual reports. The empirical study shows that the supervision system of financial inquiry letters of the stock exchange significantly restrains the tendency of management to use positive tone, and reduces the manipulative behavior of positive tone. Especially when the financial inquiry letters clearly require the intermediary agency to express opinions, it can effectively curb the management's positive tone manipulation behavior. Further research finds that there is a complementary effect between financial inquiry letters regulation and corporate internal and external governance environment. When the shareholding ratio of institutional investors is low, the inhibition effect of financial inquiry letters on both the tendency and manipulation behavior of positive tone is more significant. When the company's internal control level is poor, financial inquiry letters can significantly reduce the management's tendency to use positive tone, but it has no effect on the restraint of management's positive tone manipulation behavior.